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Abstract
By using data from nine waves of the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Sur-
vey, we explore the determinants of bilateral portfolio investments and their dynam-
ics. The main goal of our analysis is that of understanding whether a diversification
motive can be found, among the various determinants.We introduce a new diversi-
fication variable given by the correlation between the idiosyncratic components of
GDP growth and first take into account unobserved heterogeneity by means of a
country pair-fixed effect, panel estimation relaxing the more restrictive double fixed
effects model due to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (REStat 90:538-549, 2008).
We find strong evidence that a diversification motive is relevant to explain bilateral
portfolio holdings. The same results cannot be obtained from cross section esti-
mations as in previous literature. It also turns out that investing in stocks of less
synchronised partner economies does not bring about a lot of income smoothing, as
one might have expected.
Keywords: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, risk sharing, gravity models
JEL codes: F210, F150, F410
1 Introduction
The objective of this work is to explore the determinants of cross country equity portfolio
allocations, in particular, the role played by the diversification motive and its consequences
in terms of risk sharing achieved. Applying a gravity model as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008) on data from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey by the IMF (which re-
ports total bilateral portfolio investment assets), we investigate on whether investment
decisions of source countries are inspired, among the others, by risk sharing objectives.
It is often claimed that the recent surge in globalisation opened up new and large oppor-
tunities for international risk sharing. The underlying idea is that under the hypothesis
of complete markets (perfect risk sharing) agents could invest in foreign countries with a
negatively correlated business cycle, or in those countries whose business cycles differ in
volatility1. That this may or may not have occurred is a largely empirical matter, and
evidence is far from unambiguous.
The explanatory variable we use to identify a diversification motive in this work is an
original one, derived from the decomposition of GDP growth rates in an idiosyncratic and
an aggregate component, by means of a simple OLS regression as in Pierucci and Ventura
(2010). This decomposition guarantees orthogonality between the two components and
eliminates possible omitted variable biases. The correlation in the idiosyncratic compo-
nents of GDP growth will be used, as an alternative to other more standard variables2
(such as correlation in GDP growth rates), to investigate the issue on hand.
If countries were willing to reap all the potential benefits from financial globalisation, we
would expect a negative reaction of bilateral equity holdings to correlations between part-
ner countries’ idiosyncratic components of GDP. In order to diversify risk, agents within
a country should invest in partner countries whose idiosyncratic GDP is negatively cor-
related with innovations to domestic income, which would provide the investing country
with insurance against its own idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, even if this were the case,
it should still be checked whether or not cross-ownership of equity does bring about the
desired level of income smoothing; in fact, it might still be the case that the resulting
portfolio allocations are not such to secure the desired level of diversification or that, even
more likely, less idiosyncratic risk leaves room for more aggregate risk.
In this work we mainly focus on the first of the two issues, as we strive to check whether or
not countries invest more in assets of less synchronised economies. This empirical question
was also dealt with in some recent papers, namely a contribution by Portes and Rey (2005)
and another by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008); in the former, the authors analyse bilat-
eral portfolio equity trades in the context of a gravitational model and find weak evidence
for a diversification motive as an explanatory variable, after controlling for informational
frictions. The diversification motive is captured in their model by such variables as the
correlation in economies’ growth rates, stock returns and growth rates and stock returns.
In Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) the authors, always in the context of a gravitational
model, analyse bilateral portfolio equity holdings, and conclude that cross country equity
holdings do not seem to be driven by diversification purposes.
In order to explore this issue more thoroughly, along with the introduction of a new vari-
able which captures the diversification motive, we extend these seminal works along several
1Even though business cycles were perfectly synchronised it would still be possible to pool risk exploit-
ing differences in volatility of the business cycles.
2see appendix A for a detailed description of this variable.
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other dimensions. On the one hand, we use the 2001-2009 waves of the Coordinated Port-
folio Investment Survey (CPIS in the sequel) to perform a repeated cross section analysis,
in search for time varying determinants of cross equity ownership positions. More impor-
tantly, we first use the available data to build a panel dataset in order to exploit both the
cross section and longitudinal dimensions of data.This new empirical strategy helps control
for individual (pair of countries) unobserved heterogeneity, which cannot be accounted for
otherwise, and turns out to yield remarkably different results with respect to the previous
literature. That this is indeed the case will be shown in section 4, where the main empirical
findings are illustrated.
The paper also offers a partial answer to the second question, i.e. on whether or not this
diversification motive does bring about some benefits in terms of income smoothing. By
applying the methodology introduced in the seminal paper by Asdrubali et al. (1996) and
its extension developed in a recent contribution due to Balli et al. (2011) we find some
weak evidence that, indeed, countries holding equity positions in less synchronised host
economies tend to enjoy more income smoothing by foreign assets income inflows. More-
over, income smoothing seems to be enhanced in the face of positive, rather than negative,
shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 frames our empirical question into
the current literature, while section 3 presents the data and some descriptive statistics.
Section 4 presents the main empirical findings, while section 5 contains some final com-
ments. The detailed description of the variables used in the empirical analyses is relegated
to the Appendix B.
2 Literature review
The issue of portfolio equity investments has been dealt with from a number of perspectives:
financial market incompleteness, transactional frictions in asset markets, and frictions in
goods markets. All of these perspectives have in common the fact that the mutual fund
separation theorem does not hold, and that one normally sees a certain amount of home
bias in domestic portfolio holdings. In addition, all of these theoretical models provide
some insights for the construction of empirical models of portfolio equity investments.
Previous empirical works have dealt with the geography of investment flows, but always
with some specific limits dictated by data availability. In particular, most contributions
have studied the investment positions of a single country (most often, the United States),
or of very few countries. In general, most such contributions have made use of gravity mod-
els, of the kind used in international trade analysis, to analyse foreign direct investments
and banking flows. For example, Wei (2000) and Stein and Daude (2007) have analysed
the geography of FDI, while Buch (2002) and Rose and Spiegel (2004) have concentrated
on bank lending and borrowing. In all these papers the role of bilateral trade as a driver
of investment and the role of bank lending have been singled out. There has also been
a number of studies concentrating on bilateral equity investments, such as Ahearne et al.
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(2004), Dahlquist et al. (2003), Yildrim (2003), most frequently dealing with the case of
United States, and with the issue of portfolio home bias. Two remarkable exceptions stand
out in the empirical literature on this topic, i.e. the seminal contributions by Portes and
Rey (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), which we consider as the benchmarks for
our analysis. In the seminal paper by Portes and Rey (2005), the authors build on the
theoretical work by Martin and Rey (2004), where a model of general equilibrium with
endogenous asset formation leads to a gravitational model empirical specification for as-
sets trade. Portes and Rey (2005) estimate a gravitational model by using a novel dataset
including 14 countries, for the period 1989-1996. The paper by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008) applies a similar gravitational model to explain bilateral portfolio equity holdings
among a very large number of source and host countries, using data from the Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), run by the International Monetary Fund. In partic-
ular, the authors use data from the second wave of the CPIS relative to the year 2001,
featuring data from 67 source and 218 host countries.
The analysis by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) departs from earlier contributions in sev-
eral ways: by resorting to a very wide pool of source and host countries, it provides a better
identification of the potential determinants of portfolio equity investments; by developing
a double fixed effects empirical specification, i.e. adding to the empirical model two sets of
country dummies, respectively for source and host countries, in order to isolate the relative
contribution of countries’ specific factors. Among the other factors whose relevance was
tested in their empirical work, a diversification motive was also included, but results were
mixed.
Risk sharing and home bias (and consequently portfolio investments) have recently been
linked in the papers by Lewis (1999), and by Sørensen et al. (2007). Absence of interna-
tional portfolio diversification and (international) risk sharing may be closely linked, as
agents who diversify their portfolios internationally are more likely to obtain smoother
income and consumption, as for example in the model by Heathcote and Perri (2004).
Sørensen et al. (2007) find that home bias decreased while risk sharing increased during
the 1990s. They measure risk sharing as the distance of consumption growth from a sit-
uation of perfect markets (perfect consumption risk sharing), and provide a measure of
income risk sharing. Both measures show improvements, which would hint at a robust and
positive correlation between level of foreign portfolio assets and income risk sharing, and
between foreign direct investment (FDI) and consumption risk sharing.
This issue is clearly related to another very “hot” issue in the recent literature: whether
or not the surge in financial liberalization that occurred in the last two decades has ef-
fectively improved on the risk sharing opportunities available to the economies involved.
The economic literature is rather divided on this, and the empirical evidence is also quite
ambiguous. For example, Giannone and Reichlin (2006) register an increase in risk sharing
among European countries from the early 1990s when market integration significantly ac-
celerated. They also warn, however, that estimates on selected subsamples may be affected
by the subsample choice itself.
Kose et al. (2008) find very weak links between financial globalisation and risk sharing, over
the period 1960-2004, and for the two subsamples 1960-1986 (pre-globalisation) and 1987-
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2004 (globalisation). In particular, they find that although globalisation does not seem
to have exerted any significant impact on risk sharing for the whole sample of countries
and the whole period, it had a negative impact on risk sharing for emerging economies.
For the shorter globalisation sample, only developed countries seem to have reaped some
benefits from financial globalisation in term of risk sharing, whereas the subset of emerging
economies does not seem to have been affected, at least in a statistically significant way.
On the other hand, Kose et al. (2006) noticed that financial openness, as measured by gross
capital flows as a ratio to GDP, is associated to an increase in the ratio of consumption
volatility to income volatility, contrary to the notion of improved international risk sharing
opportunities through financial integration.
Kaminsky et al. (2005) investigate over the relationship of net income flows and GDP,
and find that net capital flows are procyclical in most OECD and developing countries,
i.e. countries tend to borrow in good times and repay in bad times, which would suggest
that these flows may play a destabilising role. On the other hand, Bai and Zhang (2004)
conduct a regression analysis (both panel and cross section) dividing their whole sample
(1973-1998) in two distinct sub-samples (1973-1985; 1986-1998) and conducting separate
tests for 19 developed countries, for 21 developing countries and for the whole set of coun-
tries. Their study shows that, although the degree of financial integration doubles from
the first to the second sub-period, there is no substantial improvement in international
risk sharing. Moreover, they claim that international risk sharing is not sensitive to the
increase in financial integration.
That the need or possibility for diversification of idiosyncratic risks may also be a deter-
minant for bilateral portfolio positions has surfaced in other recent contributions, but only
very few have attempted to perform an empirical verification. An interesting work, in this
field, is that by Bracke and Schmitz (2008) who try to understand whether portfolio equity
investments play a role in consumption risk sharing both via net investment income and
via capital gains. To do so, they analyse a dataset comprising 35 industrial and emerging
market economies.
Our work is also closely related to some recent papers dealing with the issue of under-
standing whether stronger economic linkages among countries are associated to more or
less synchronised business cycles. Here, too, the empirical evidence is not unambiguous.
Recent works by Imbs (2006), Kose et al. (2004) and Otto and Willard (2001) show that
more bilateral portfolio equity flows bring about more correlated business cycles. On the
other hand, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) show that when fixed pair and time effects are
properly taken into account, the empirical relationship between international banking inte-
gration and business cycles synchronisation becomes negative. In this respect, our findings
are similar, as regards bilateral portfolio equity holdings. Indeed, we find that the em-
pirical relationship between cross country equity portfolio holdings and some measure of
(idiosyncratic) output correlation (our diversification motive variable) switches from posi-
tive to negative as we move from a cross section (double fixed effects model a` la Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2008)) to a fixed effects, panel specification. Accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity seems therefore crucial in correctly assessing the impact of less correlated
cycles onto cross country equity holdings, and vice versa.
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3 Data
Data on bilateral equity holdings for years 2001 up to 2009 come from nine waves of
the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). For each reporting country and for each year, the survey reports the year-end value
of the stock of cross-border equity holdings disaggregated by issuer country. Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2008) recognize that the main limitations of the 2001 survey originate from
the following facts: incomplete source/host country coverage, heterogeneity of collection
methods, underreporting of assets and biases induced by third-party holdings. In our
analysis problems arising from collection methods are attenuated by using nine waves of
the CPIS survey, as the quality of data collected by source countries increases after the first
participation to the survey (Warnock (2006)). Moreover, in order to reduce the relevance
of the last two limitations of the dataset and in particular biases originated by the mutual
funds industry (Felettigh and Monti (2008)), we have excluded offshore countries from the
analysis.
For comparative purposes we included 67 source countries3 and 218 host countries4 as
in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008). Original data are expressed in current US dollars. As
we are interested in the real changes of cross country holdings (actual purchases or sales
of assets over time), and since the value of asset holdings may also change because prices
(both of stock and of currencies) do, we need to offset these nominal changes, by deflating
data on equity holdings using a Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) price index
(period average, base year 2001), and by using an index number of bilateral exchange rate
between US dollars and the currency of the host country (base year 2001). By the same
token, bilateral trade across countries has been adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations. As
a result of all these adjustments, equity values are expressed in 2001 current US dollars, at
2001 stock prices. Most covariates have been computed following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008).5
In tables 1 and 2 we report percentage shares and the growth rates of bilateral equity asset
holdings (weighted by period average shares) aggregating over 6 major areas. Data are
expressed, as explained in the previous section, at “constant, 2001 prices”, since they are
adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations and for valuation effects. Offshore centres have
been removed, to avoid distortions. Thus, statistics in table 1 and 2 refer to the dependent
variable of our regression analyses.
Over the period 2001-2009, the weight of OECD countries is dominant (table 1), since
around 74 percent of the total amount of equity asset holdings is due to U.S., UK and
Euro Area; however, their role is becoming less important over the observed period of
3See appendix A for a complete list of source and host countries included in the analysis.
4Source refers to countries undertaking an investment, i.e. purchasing equities in a foreign country,
while hosts refers to countries receiving the investment.
5For a detailed description of data see appendix B.
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time. In particular, the U.S. and the Euro Area lost respectively about 5 and 2.5 per-
cent of their shares, while UK just lost 0.9 percent. On the contrary, Japan gained one
percentage point, “other OECD” countries and Emerging markets registered a remarkable
increase of their weight (around 4 percent).
Unweighted rates of growth of equity asset holdings6 reveal how Emerging markets quadru-
pled their international portfolio size, “other OECD countries” and Japan doubled, whereas
U.S., UK and the Euro Area have been growing below average, increasing their equity asset
positions by around 50 percent.
If we now look at weighted7 rates of growth (table 2), about half of the increase in total
investment can be attributed to emerging markets and to “other OECD countries”.
Summing up, total growth of equity asset holdings amounts to 76.2 percent and the in-
creasing role of emerging economies and the attractiveness of U.S. and European markets
for these countries become quite evident. Moreover, the persistence of bilateral investment
patterns decreased somehow over the whole time horizon in comparison to what was de-
tected by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) between 2001 and 2005.8 It seems fair to say
that, looking at data, we find evidence of an ongoing change of the international investment
patterns, calling for a deeper investigation over the entire available time horizon.
4 Empirical findings
This section describes the way we used CPIS data for our empirical analyses (cross sec-
tion and panel estimations). First, cross section regressions, as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008), have been estimated for all available waves, controlling for countries’ characteris-
tics by the inclusion of “double fixed effects” for source and host countries. Secondly, in
order to properly account for unobserved heterogeneity, we exploit the time dimension of
the data estimating a panel regression model which includes individual fixed effects for
each pair of source-host countries. This new approach is less restrictive, since it allows
controlling for specific “pair” effects. The combination of any two countries, in fact, might
be influenced by a fixed factor, potentially different from the linear combination of the two
individual countries effects.
Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), the estimated model for our cross section re-
gressions is:
log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij (1)
where xij is the portfolio equity holdings of country i in country j; Zij is a vector of co-
variates; φi and φj are dummy variables for source and host countries, respectively. This
6Not reported. Available upon request.
7By the corresponding percentage shares of the total.
8If one regresses, as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), the log of equity positions in 2001 on the log of
equity positions in 2005, one obtains an elasticity of 0.84, while the same exercise between 2001 and 2009
yields an elasticity of about 0.73.
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model includes a dummy variable for each source and each host country, so that the con-
stant term is the sum of φi and φj, capturing individual heterogeneity of countries i and
j. This approach allows exploiting the bilateral dimension of the data to take into account
nationals’ characteristics.
However, since our dataset comprises several cross sections, corresponding to various time
periods, the time dimension can also be used, allowing for the inclusion of standard indi-
vidual fixed effects, i.e. source-host pairs dummies. The inclusion of “country pairs fixed
effects” allows to capture the unobserved heterogeneity which characterizes any bilateral
portfolio equity allocations. This is more general than the “double fixed effects” model
(eq. 1 as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008)), which imposes each country’s fixed effect to
be identical irrespective of the partner country (host or source). In terms of the number of
dummy variables to be estimated, in the more restrictive model a total of i+j individual
dummies is to be estimated, while in the panel estimation i · j individual fixed effects are
included.
Therefore, for the panel analysis we adopt the following original fixed effects model speci-
fication:
log(xijt) = φij + νt + βZijt + ijt (2)
where φij are individual intercepts and νt are time fixed effects.
4.1 Cross section analysis
For comparative purposes, the first step of our analysis consisted in replicating the empiri-
cal evidence offered by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) for the year 2001 and its extension
for the whole available sampling period, i.e. 2002-2009, in order to assess possible changes
over time in the determinants of international asset allocation choices of responding coun-
tries. This preliminary analysis (not reported, available upon request) highlights that the
main conclusions achieved for year 2001 remain valid also in subsequent years (2002-2009).
However, a relevant change in the estimated coefficients has been detected, revealing vari-
ability over time and the need to investigate on the bilateral investment pattern over the
widest available time horizon.
As a second step of our cross section analysis, we estimated the model proposed by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2008) for all available waves (2001-2009) by introducing some additional
explanatory variables. In particular, we replaced the variable expressing the correlation
between GDP growths (a diversification motive variable) with a different one, containing
the correlation among the idiosyncratic components of GDP growth. Details about the
computation of this variable can be found in the data appendix. It is worth mentioning
one more new explanatory variable included: the overall score of freedom in the host coun-
try, produced by The Heritage Foundation9.
The estimation results, presented in tables 3-5 for the whole sample and for two subsam-
ples (OECD and emerging economies), essentially confirm those presented in Lane and
9http://www.heritage.org/
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Milesi-Ferretti (2008): throughout the years, bilateral trade is the single most important
explanatory variable of cross country portfolio holdings, though its relevance is larger in
the first years of the sample for OECD countries, whereas the contrary is true for emerging
market economies.
Other variables proxying for information asymmetries and sociocultural proximity are more
or less significant in explaining portfolio holdings over the years: the logarithm of distance
among countries, the logarithm of time difference, as well as various dummies for common
language, for colonial past and for being party in a tax treaty or in a currency union.
To identify a diversification motive for portfolio cross holdings three variables have been in-
cluded in the regressions: correlations in idiosyncratic GDPs; correlations between growth
and stock returns; correlations in stock returns. The estimated coefficient of the first vari-
able often displays the “right” negative sign but it is always non-significant. Correlations
between growth and stock returns are never significant except for the years 2004-2006 and
for the OECD subsample (table 4) where this variable enters with a negative sign. The
last diversification motive variable is almost always significant on the full sample (table 3)
with a positive sign, indicating that agents seem to hold portfolios in countries which are
rather similar, in terms of stock markets returns.
The overall score of freedom always enters with a positive and significant coefficient across
all estimation periods for the full sample and the OECD, while it gains importance and
significance for emerging economies as we move towards the end of the time horizon (2009,
though, seems to be an exception). Tables 3-5 give an idea of the variability across years
of estimated coefficients; a cursory reading of these tables show that, for the whole sample
of countries, the coefficients of the most important explanatory variable, bilateral trade,
increases in magnitude over the whole sample, though non monotonically.
The relevance of the other significant variables, i.e. time difference, common language,
colonial past, common legal origin and the overall score of freedom in the host country,
significantly varies across periods, but at the end of the time horizon is not very different
from what it was at the beginning. As for the OECD countries, the relevance of the bi-
lateral trade variable has an opposite behaviour (i.e. decreases over time). The estimated
models for the emerging countries are the ones yielding the less satisfactory results, with
many explanatory variables being only occasionally significant.
4.2 Panel analysis
The estimation results change in a remarkable way as we move to a panel estimation. As
it is well known, in the context of panel estimations it is possible to properly assess the
relevance of fixed effects, i.e. the impact of factors which are peculiar to the individual
observations. In our case each observation concerns a pair (source-host) of countries, and
the fixed effect refers to some factor which plays a role for this couple, but not necessarily
for each economy in isolation. Therefore, any fixed effect is likely to capture the (possibly
stable) effect of variables which are specific to the interaction between those economies,
and which cannot be observed or are difficult to quantify. It is highly plausible that such
unaccounted factors be correlated with our proxies for a diversification motive (correlation
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between idiosyncratic components of GDP, correlations between stock market returns or
correlations between GDP growth and stock returns). If these unobserved factors become
part of the disturbance term, as it is likely to be the case in purely cross sectional es-
timations, the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients of diversification motive
variables may be biased. As already suggested above, simple source and host country
effects, included in the cross section estimations, may not adequately account for such
factors.
On the other hand, endogeneity of our diversification proxies may also be an issue. En-
dogeneity may come in as reverse causation, going from cross country equity positions to
correlation in stock returns or in the idiosyncratic components of GDP growth. We do
not take a specific (theoretical or empirical) stance on this issue, which should constitute
the topic of further work. However, we adopt an instrumental variable, fixed effect panel
estimation methodology, which guarantees consistency of our coefficients’ estimates. This
has been done only for estimations in levels, as for log difference estimations we did not find
adequate instruments (but we also believe that the case for endogeneity is less compelling
for log differences). The instruments used (lags of the proxies for diversification and lags
of bilateral trade) satisfactorily pass both the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions
and a simple F test of joint significance (in explaining the endogenous variables).
All models are estimated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors White (1980).
As robustness check we also use Driscoll and Kraay standard errors, where the error struc-
ture is assumed to be heteroscedastic, autocorrelated of order one, and possibly correlated
between the groups (panels) (Driscoll and Kraay (1998)). Though the Driscoll Kraay stan-
dard error correction relies on large T asymptotics, it performs satisfactorily for large N
and small T10 as in our case (for details see Hoechle (2007)). Moreover, since we introduce
a variable to account for the overall degree of economic freedom in the host country, we
estimate each model with and without this variable in order to assess the impact of this
variable on the remaining coefficients. We report in table 6 panel estimates over the period
2001-2009 for the whole sample and the two subsamples (OECD countries and emerging
economies). We may immediately observe that all the time invariant variables cannot be
included, their effect being somehow summarized in the cross section fixed effects.
While the effect of bilateral trade is almost always strong and positive, and the overall
level of freedom in the host country is always positively significant, as it was the case in
the cross section estimations, our original research question receives a completely different
answer from the panel analysis with respect to the previous cross section estimates. For
the full sample, both the correlation between the idiosyncratic components of GDP and
the correlation in stock returns turn out to be significantly negative in the linear specifica-
tion (columns 1 and 2 in table 6). Interestingly, even in the face of a positive correlation
between the two variables, they are both significant, suggesting that the co-movements
between the idiosyncratic components of GDP are significant even if one controls for the
correlation between stock returns in the two economies. This is true both for the linear
and the Tobit specifications. However, for the Tobit model, the correlation in the idiosyn-
10for T=5 and T=10
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cratic components of GDP still remains negatively significant whereas correlations in stock
returns turn up to be positively significant meaning that the probability of investing in
a foreign country is positively affected by similarities in stock markets dynamics of the
partner countries. This result is also confirmed by a Probit model.
When we look at the results for the two subsamples, however, the diversification motive
expressed by the correlation in stock returns is supported by the linear specification, but
not by the Tobit model. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient of our new diversifi-
cation motive variable (i.e. the correlations in idiosyncratic GDP) is significantly negative
for the Tobit model. This suggests that the decision to engage in portfolio investments,
and the decision about the size of the investment, might have different determinants rel-
ative to the subsamples. In particular, it turns out that the former depends more on the
closeness and similarity of the pair of economies, although it may well be the case that
once the decision to hold an equity position in a country is taken, the investment size may
also be determined by diversification motives. This is confirmed by the regression results
of the corresponding Probit models (column 6 of table 6), where one of the diversification
variables, namely the correlation in stock returns, has a positive and significant coefficient.
We get a different result with the tax treaty variable. The fact that a pair of countries
engage in a tax treaty appears to be significant in determining the choice of investing, but
it does not seem to have an impact upon the relative dimension of portfolio investments.
That diversification may have opposite effects on the choice of investing and on the cor-
responding amounts is somehow reminiscent of the discussion of the empirical results in
Portes and Rey (2005), where the authors observe that the variables proxying for a diver-
sification motive enter with a positive sign if one does not control for information frictions
(above all, distance), whereas the sign becomes (weakly) negative when such factors are
controlled for. In our panel estimations information frictions should be captured by the
pair fixed effects, and the larger dataset (and possibly the different estimation horizon)
allows us to better identify a diversification motive at work.
Table 7 reports results for log differenced data and previous results on log levels are con-
firmed with respect to the existence of a diversification motive driving the amount of
investing in equity holdings in foreign countries.
Our diversification motive variable is, indeed, always negative and highly significant for
the full sample and the OECD sub sample.
4.3 Business cycle desynchronisation and risk sharing
The existence of differences among national business cycles opens the way to insurance
possibilities which can be exploited to reduce the longitudinal variance of national income,
thus increasing national welfare.
Up to this point we have been able to identify a diversification motive as a determinant
of portfolio choices. In the previous paragraph, we found that the correlation between the
idiosyncratic components of GDP growth (and in stock returns) plays a non-negligible role
in driving the cross-border allocation of investments in the global stock market. Does this
necessarily entail that portfolio allocations have been effective in insuring countries against
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bad states of nature?
To deal with this matter, we measure the degree of risk sharing achieved through equity
purchases on foreign stock markets. Foreign equities held by residents generate an income
that adds to their disposable income and is recorded in the current account of the balance
of payments. Following the methodology first introduced by Asdrubali et al. (1996) and
later developed by Balli et al. (2011) we assess the degree of income smoothing brought
about by income inflows generated by holdings of foreign equities (for a detailed explana-
tion of the methodology see Appendix C).
The analysis has been conducted separately for the set of countries adhering to the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU) and for the set of OECD countries. Firstly, we have com-
puted a measure of lack of (potentially exploitable) risk sharing opportunities, given by
the (weighted11) mean correlations of idiosyncratic GDP growth of a given source country
with idiosyncratic GDP growth of all its host countries. This indicator is, by construction,
inversely related to risk sharing opportunities. Indeed, the higher the correlation among
idiosyncratic GDP components, the lower should be the cross-country insurance opportu-
nities.
Secondly, we have computed, for each country of the group, the degree of risk sharing
achieved through inflows deriving from foreign equity holdings, following a rather standard
approach. 12
Lastly we compared the two measures. Indeed, if financial assets holdings are effective in
smoothing income across states of nature, we should observe an inverse relationship be-
tween weighted average correlations in idiosyncratic GDP’s and the degree of risk sharing
achieved by each country.
Table 8 contains the values taken by these two variables for the various countries, as well
as various indices of correlations among them. The same analysis has been repeated by al-
lowing for the possibility of asymmetric responses of income inflows to idiosyncratic shock
to GDP, that is a degree of risk sharing is assumed to depend on the state of the business
cycle. To do so, we have divided shock variable into positive and negative realisations
identified by positive and negative output gap respectively computed isolating the long
run component of GDP applying a standard Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter13. All in
all, if we consider all (positive and negative) shocks, our priors are weakly confirmed in
the case of EMU countries (significance values of correlations in the range 0.20-0.25), while
they should be strongly rejected for the set of OECD countries.
Once we distinguish among positive and negative shocks, we obtain a somewhat neater
picture. Indeed, for EMU countries correlations are strongly significant (significance val-
ues in the range 0.01-0.02) in the case of positive shocks, while they are not significant at
all in the case of negative shocks.
In other words, equity holdings in less “synchronised” economies help smooth income peaks
associated to favourable states of nature, while they do not seem effective in smoothing
11weights are the shares of equity holdings of a country in a given host country
12see Balli et al. (2011)
13see details in appendix C.
12
income troughs experienced during bad states of nature. Moreover, by directly looking
at the values of mean correlations and percentages of income smoothing for the various
countries we realize that, despite a non-significant negative correlation, in two remarkable
cases, namely the Netherlands and Great Britain, featuring a low (under 0.20) mean cor-
relation in the dynamics of idiosyncratic GDP growth, negative shocks are smoothed via
portfolio equity holdings (24.69 and 17.73 percent, respectively).
5 Conclusions
The recent surge in financial globalisation opened up many investment opportunities for
the countries involved. One possible outcome of this process is an increase in portfolio
diversification, if bilateral holdings are also driven by diversification motives. Whether
or not this has been the case is the research question addressed in this paper, where we
extend the analysis proposed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) to the 2001-2009 waves
of the IMF Coordinated Investment Portfolio Survey; this question is addressed by means
of both cross section and panel methodologies. The main empirical result of our analysis
is that, indeed, a diversification motive emerges from the data, which mainly concerns the
relative size of portfolio holdings. It also turns out, however, that the decision to open
portfolio positions in a country depends more on symmetries, rather than differences, in
the two countries’ cycles.
Our empirical results also shed some light upon the issue of business cycle desynchronisation
among portfolio partner countries and the corresponding capabilities of income risk sharing.
6 Appendix A
List of source countries excluding offshore centres:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Ko-
rea (Republic of), Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela.
List of host countries excluding offshore centres:
Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azer-
baijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Congo (Republic of), Costa Rica, Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Faroe Islands, Fiji, Finland, France,
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French Guiana, French Polynesia, French Southern Territories, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Greenland, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (Democratic People’s Re-
public of), Korea (Republic of), Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia,
Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania,
Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Por-
tugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, San Marino, Sa˜o Tome`
and Pr`ıncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Helena, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, United States Minor Outlying
Islands, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vatican City State, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Islands
(United States), Wallis and Futuna Islands, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
7 Appendix B
Bilateral portfolio equity holdings:
millions of U.S. dollar of portfolio equity holdings issued by host countries and held by
source country. Source: 2001-2009 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
Bilateral trade:
five-year backward looking moving average of imports plus exports over the period 2001-
2009. Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database.
Colony dummy:
dummy taking the value 1 if source and host country ever had a colonial relationship and
zero otherwise. Source Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Common language:
dummy variable taking value 1 if host and source countries share the same language and
zero otherwise. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
Common legal origin:
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the source and and host countries have a legal system
with a common origin (common law, French, German or Scandinavian) and 0 otherwise.
Source: Porta et al. (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
Correlation between growth-stock returns:
twenty one-year backward looking moving average correlation between annual GDP growth
rates in the source country and real stock returns in the host country over the period 2001-
2009. For instruments used in the IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking
moving average has been restricted to just ten years. Source: authors’ calculation based
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on Morgan Stanley Capital International (Datastream) and World Bank (on-line database
World Development Indicators).
Correlation in idiosyncratic GDP:
twenty one-year backward looking moving average correlation between the annual idiosyn-
cratic GDP growth rate of source and host countries over the period 2001-2009. For in-
struments used in the IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking moving average
has been restricted to just ten years. As in Pierucci and Ventura (2010), the idiosyncratic
component of GDP growth is computed as the estimated residuals of the following regres-
sion ∆ log(GDPit) = β∆ log(GDPat) + it. Where ∆ log(GDPit) is the country i GDP rate
of growth and ∆ log(GDPat) represents the average rate of growth of the reference group
(in our case: all countries; OECD countries and Emerging Markets). The GDP growth
rate of a given country is therefore decomposed in two orthogonal components: in fact,
∆ log(GDPit) = β̂∆ log(GDPat) + eit, thus the idiosyncratic GDP growth will be orthog-
onal to the aggregate (group average) GDP growth by construction: eit⊥β̂∆ log(GDPat).
The more standard practice (e.g. Asdrubali et al. (1996)) consists in simply subtracting the
group average GDP growth to each country’ s GDP rate of growth. However, this practice
does not guarantee orthogonality between aggregate and idiosyncratic GDP growth and
may generate serious omitted variable bias if one of the regressors strongly correlates with
the aggregate GDP growth. Moreover the standard decomposition restricts the coefficient
attached to aggregate GDP to be equal to 1, while the empirical evidence contradicts this
assumption.
Correlation in stock returns:
eleven-year backward looking moving average correlation between the monthly stock mar-
ket returns of the host and source country, expressed in U.S. dollars over the period 2001-
2009. For instruments used in the IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking
moving average has been restricted to just five years. Source: authors’ calculations based
on returns data from Morgan Stanley Capital International (Datastream).
Currency Union dummy:
dummy variable taking value 1 if source and host countries are in a currency union and
zero otherwise. Source Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Log distance:
logarithm of Great Circle distance in miles between the capital cities of source and host
country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Overall score of freedom in the host country:
overall freedom score ranging from zero to 100 given by the average of ten component
scores: business freedom; trade freedom; fiscal freedom; Government spending; monetary
freedom; investment freedom; financial freedom; property rights; freedom from corruption;
labour freedom. All 10 components are weighted equally. Source: The Heritage Founda-
tion (http://www.heritage.org/)
Tax treaty:
dummy variable taking value 1 if source and host countries enacted a double taxation agree-
ment prior to 1999. Agreements considered are: Capital, Income and Capital, Income and
15
Inheritance. Double taxation agreements on Air, Land and Sea Transport have been ex-
cluded. Source: Authors’ elaborations on DTT (Double Taxation Treaties) database from
www.unctad.org.
Time difference:
absolute value of of time difference between host and source country (from 1 to 12). Source:
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Rose and Spiegel (2004).
8 Appendix C
In the analysis reported in table 8, applying a time series counterpart of the variance
decomposition first introduced by Asdrubali et al. (1996), we computed the percentage of
risk sharing achieved through financial asset income inflows (sub-component of the factor
income) as in Balli et al. (2011). Thus, for each country of the two groups considered
(OECD and EMU countries), we estimated the following equation obtaining the percentage
of income smoothing achieved by income inflows deriving from financial assets holding by
each single country.
˜∆ logGDPINt = β+f ˜∆ logGDPt + t
where:
GDPINt = (GDP+financial assets income inflows);˜∆ logGDPINt = (∆ logGDPINt −∆ logGDPINat );˜∆ logGDPt = (∆ logGDPt −∆ logGDP at );
∆ logGDPINat and ∆ logGDP
a
t are group averages. 1 − β+f is the percentage of income
smoothing achieved through the portfolio equity holdings channel (inflows). We then dis-
tinguished between positive and negative idiosyncratic shocks, identifying positive shocks
as those corresponding to periods of positive output gap14. This allows to estimate the
smoothing role of assets income inflows in the face of asymmetries in shocks.
˜∆ logGDPINt = β+f1 ˜∆ logGDPt+ + β+f2 ˜∆ logGDPt− + t
where 1 − β+f1 is the percentage of risk sharing with respect to positive shocks, while
1 − β+f2 is the same measure in response to negative shocks. The data span is from 1980
to 2009 (annual frequency). Source: International Monetary Fund (Balance of Payments
Statistics).
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Table 1: International Equity Asset Holdings
(% shares over the year-total)
Source / Host Usa Uk Euro Japan Other
OECD
Emerging
markets
Total
2001-2009
United States 0.0 7.3 9.4 5.7 5.4 5.5 33.4
United Kingdom 4.7 0.0 3.7 1.6 1.0 1.4 12.5
Euro area 9.2 3.8 9.9 1.5 1.7 1.1 27.3
Japan 3.5 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.3 5.6
Other OECD Countries 8.9 1.8 3.1 1.2 1.0 0.7 16.7
Emerging markets 1.4 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.2 4.5
Total 27.8 14.7 27.3 10.3 9.6 10.3 100.0
2001
United States - 8.8 11.5 4.3 6.2 5.0 35.7
United Kingdom 3.2 - 5.6 1.3 1.4 1.3 12.9
Euro area 8.1 4.2 11.2 1.1 2.2 1.1 27.9
Japan 3.1 0.7 0.9 - 0.4 0.2 5.3
Other OECD Countries 7.2 1.8 3.5 0.9 1.0 0.7 15.2
Emerging markets 0.8 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 3.0
Total 22.4 16.6 32.9 7.7 11.3 9.1 100.0
2002
United States - 8.2 10.6 4.9 6.1 4.7 34.5
United Kingdom 4.0 - 4.4 1.6 1.5 1.4 12.8
Euro area 8.2 4.5 11.2 1.3 2.2 0.9 28.3
Japan 3.2 0.7 0.9 - 0.4 0.2 5.4
Other OECD Countries 7.8 1.9 3.3 1.1 1.1 0.6 15.8
Emerging markets 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.7 3.1
Total 24.0 16.4 30.7 9.0 11.4 8.4 100.0
2003
United States - 8.1 10.0 5.6 5.9 5.6 35.3
United Kingdom 3.9 - 3.6 1.6 1.0 1.5 11.5
Euro area 9.1 4.1 11.3 1.6 1.9 1.2 29.0
Japan 3.2 0.6 0.8 - 0.3 0.2 5.2
Other OECD Countries 7.9 1.8 3.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 15.8
Emerging Countries 0.8 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.8 3.2
Total 24.9 15.7 29.3 10.0 10.2 10.0 100.0
2004
United States - 6.8 10.1 5.6 5.5 5.5 33.4
United Kingdom 4.5 - 4.2 1.6 0.8 1.6 12.7
Euro area 9.6 3.7 11.0 1.7 1.7 1.1 28.8
Japan 3.7 0.7 0.8 - 0.4 0.3 5.8
Other OECD Countries 8.4 1.6 3.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 15.8
Emerging markets 1.0 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9 3.6
Total 27.1 14.0 29.4 10.2 9.3 10.0 100.0
2005
United States - 6.7 9.3 7.3 5.5 5.8 34.7
United Kingdom 5.0 - 3.5 2.1 1.0 1.4 13.1
Euro area 9.4 3.5 9.7 2.0 1.7 1.2 27.4
Japan 3.6 0.5 0.7 - 0.3 0.3 5.4
Other OECD Countries 8.3 1.6 2.8 1.4 0.8 0.6 15.5
Emerging markets 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.1 3.9
Total 27.3 13.5 26.4 13.1 9.3 10.4 100.0
2006
United States - 6.5 9.3 6.2 5.1 6.0 33.1
United Kingdom 5.4 - 3.3 1.9 0.9 1.4 13.0
Euro area 10.0 3.6 9.9 2.0 1.6 1.3 28.5
Japan 3.4 0.5 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 5.3
Other OECD Countries 8.4 1.6 2.9 1.2 0.9 0.8 15.8
Emerging markets 1.4 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.5 4.3
Total 28.7 13.1 26.4 11.5 8.9 11.4 100.0
2007
United States - 6.0 9.0 6.5 5.1 6.3 32.9
United Kingdom 5.4 - 2.8 1.8 0.8 1.5 12.4
Euro area 9.8 3.2 8.5 1.8 1.5 1.4 26.1
Japan 3.3 0.4 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 5.2
Other OECD Countries 9.9 1.6 3.1 1.4 0.9 0.9 17.8
Emerging markets 1.9 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.8 5.6
Total 30.4 12.1 24.4 11.9 8.8 12.4 100.0
2008
United States - 6.4 7.9 6.8 4.7 5.0 30.8
United Kingdom 5.9 - 2.9 1.6 0.7 1.2 12.2
Euro area 10.1 3.4 8.1 0.9 1.4 0.8 24.7
Japan 4.2 0.6 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 6.2
Other OECD Countries 11.3 2.0 2.9 1.5 1.0 0.8 19.5
Emerging markets 2.5 1.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 1.7 6.6
Total 34.0 13.8 22.8 11.3 8.2 9.8 100.0
2009
United States - 8.2 7.4 4.3 4.9 5.8 30.6
United Kingdom 5.3 - 3.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 12.0
Euro area 8.9 3.9 8.4 0.9 1.3 1.3 24.7
Japan 4.1 0.7 0.7 - 0.4 0.4 6.3
Other OECD Countries 10.5 2.6 3.1 1.1 1.2 0.9 19.5
Emerging markets 2.4 2.0 0.7 0.3 0.1 1.4 6.9
Total 31.3 17.5 23.4 7.9 9.0 11.0 100.0
Table 2: International Equity Asset Holdings
(annual % changes weighted by the share)
Source / Host Usa Uk Euro Japan Other
OECD
Emerging
markets
Total
2001/2009
United States - 5.7 1.4 3.3 2.5 5.2 18.1
United Kingdom 6.1 - -0.2 0.9 0.6 0.8 8.2
Euro area 7.7 2.7 3.6 0.5 0.0 1.1 15.6
Japan 4.1 0.5 0.4 - 0.3 0.5 5.9
Other OECD Countries 11.3 2.8 2.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 19.1
Emerging Countries 3.5 2.5 1.0 0.4 0.1 1.8 9.3
Total 32.7 14.2 8.3 6.1 4.6 10.3 76.2
2001/2002
United States - -0.4 -0.7 0.7 0.1 -0.2 -0.5
United Kingdom 0.8 - -1.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2
Euro area 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.9
Japan 0.2 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.2
Other OECD Countries 0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.9
Emerging Countries 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Total 2.0 0.1 -1.6 1.5 0.3 -0.5 1.9
2002/2003
United States - 2.7 2.9 2.6 1.9 2.9 12.9
United Kingdom 1.3 - 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.6 2.7
Euro area 4.0 1.0 4.0 0.8 0.3 0.7 10.8
Japan 1.1 0.1 0.2 - 0.1 0.1 1.6
Other OECD Countries 2.8 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 5.5
Emerging Countries 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.2
Total 9.5 4.6 8.7 4.4 2.3 5.0 34.6
2003/2004
United States - -1.8 -0.8 -0.4 -0.9 -0.6 -4.5
United Kingdom 0.2 - 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.1
Euro area -0.3 -0.6 -1.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -2.5
Japan 0.2 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.2
Other OECD Countries -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -1.3
Emerging Countries 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Total 0.0 -2.8 -2.2 -0.6 -1.6 -0.8 -8.0
2004/2005
United States - 0.4 -0.2 2.2 0.3 0.7 3.4
United Kingdom 0.8 - -0.4 0.7 0.2 -0.1 1.2
Euro area 0.4 0.0 -0.7 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.3
Japan 0.1 -0.1 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Other OECD Countries 0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.7
Emerging Countries 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.6
Total 1.9 0.3 -1.4 3.7 0.6 1.1 6.2
2005/2006
United States - 0.5 1.0 -0.5 0.1 0.8 2.0
United Kingdom 1.0 - 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.4
Euro area 1.7 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 4.1
Japan 0.2 0.1 0.0 - 0.0 0.1 0.5
Other OECD Countries 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.2 2.0
Emerging Countries 0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.8
Total 4.4 1.0 2.9 -0.4 0.5 2.2 10.7
2006/2007
United States - -1.1 -1.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -3.4
United Kingdom -0.5 - -0.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -1.8
Euro area -1.2 -0.7 -2.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 -4.9
Japan -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 - 0.0 0.0 -0.6
Other OECD Countries 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3
Emerging Countries 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8
Total -1.1 -2.1 -4.4 -0.8 -1.0 -0.2 -9.6
2007/2008
United States - -1.6 -3.6 -1.9 -1.9 -2.9 -11.7
United Kingdom -1.4 - -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 -0.7 -4.0
Euro area -2.9 -0.8 -2.9 -1.1 -0.5 -0.9 -9.2
Japan -0.5 0.0 -0.2 - -0.1 -0.2 -1.0
Other OECD Countries -2.1 -0.3 -1.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -4.4
Emerging Countries -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.0
Total -7.1 -2.6 -8.8 -4.1 -3.1 -5.6 -31.3
2008/2009
United States - 9.3 6.2 1.4 4.7 6.0 27.6
United Kingdom 4.3 - 3.1 0.8 1.4 1.1 10.7
Euro area 7.0 4.1 7.9 0.9 1.1 1.7 22.6
Japan 3.6 0.7 0.7 - 0.4 0.4 5.9
Other OECD Countries 8.8 3.0 3.1 0.5 1.3 1.0 17.7
Emerging Countries 2.1 2.4 0.9 0.1 0.1 1.0 6.7
Total 25.8 19.6 21.9 3.7 9.0 11.2 91.2
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Table 6: 2001-2009 Panel estimates with pair fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Panel FE IV Panel FE IV Panel FE IV Panel FE IV Tobit Tobit Probit Probit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.3183∗∗∗ 0.3183 0.3362∗∗∗ 0.3362 0.7586∗∗∗ 0.7754∗∗∗ 0.0457∗∗∗ 0.0469∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.213) (0.066) (0.215) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Corr. idiosync. GDP −0.3009∗∗ −0.3009∗∗ −0.3302∗∗∗ −0.3302∗∗∗−0.2715∗∗∗ −0.1924∗∗∗−0.0073 −0.0011
(0.121) (0.133) (0.121) (0.115) (0.051) (0.052) (0.009) (0.009)
Correl. in stock returns −2.2683∗∗∗ −2.2683∗∗∗ −2.2229∗∗∗ −2.2229∗∗∗ 5.1106∗∗∗ 4.3438∗∗∗ 0.4401∗∗∗ 0.3837∗∗∗
(0.567) (0.746) (0.563) (0.727) (0.096) (0.099) (0.016) (0.016)
Correl. growth-stock return −0.0430 −0.0430 −0.0235 −0.0235 0.1051∗ 0.1910∗∗∗−0.0300∗∗∗−0.0252∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.424) (0.321) (0.407) (0.055) (0.054) (0.007) (0.007)
Tax treaty −0.0519 −0.0519 −0.0573 −0.0573 0.2949∗∗∗ 0.3860∗∗∗ 0.0987∗∗∗ 0.1004∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.093) (0.105) (0.092) (0.038) (0.037) (0.006) (0.006)
Freedom in host country 0.0344∗∗∗ 0.0344∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.013) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant −8.5580∗∗∗−10.4575∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.137)
Observations 9267 9267 9267 9267 13229 13229 13438 13438
R-squared 0.089 0.089 0.092 0.092 0.219 0.225 0.343 0.348
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3385∗∗∗ 0.3385∗ 0.3472∗∗∗ 0.3472∗∗ 0.7664∗∗∗ 0.7945∗∗∗ 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.174) (0.074) (0.175) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001)
Corr. idiosync. GDP −0.0753 −0.0753 −0.1036 −0.1036 −0.1492∗∗∗ −0.0666 0.0020 0.0032
(0.110) (0.116) (0.111) (0.119) (0.058) (0.056) (0.007) (0.007)
Correl. in stock returns −2.9379∗∗∗ −2.9379∗∗∗ −2.8842∗∗∗ −2.8842∗∗∗ 5.3078∗∗∗ 4.0995∗∗∗ 0.2869∗∗∗ 0.2623∗∗∗
(0.526) (0.307) (0.525) (0.307) (0.105) (0.116) (0.012) (0.013)
Correl. growth-stock return −0.0600 −0.0600 −0.0406 −0.0406 0.4185∗∗∗ 0.4714∗∗∗−0.0235∗∗∗−0.0229∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.320) (0.348) (0.306) (0.059) (0.058) (0.005) (0.005)
Tax treaty 0.0612 0.0612 0.0540 0.0540 0.0750 0.2750∗∗∗ 0.0446∗∗∗ 0.0469∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.098) (0.110) (0.099) (0.046) (0.046) (0.005) (0.005)
Freedom in host country 0.0200∗∗ 0.0200∗ 0.0433∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.011) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant −7.9142∗∗∗−10.6443∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.146)
Observations 6495 6495 6495 6495 8623 8623 8766 8766
R-squared 0.103 0.103 0.105 0.105 0.253 0.264 0.363 0.364
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1733 0.1733 0.2074 0.2074 0.6061∗∗∗ 0.6114∗∗∗ 0.0967∗∗∗ 0.1003∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.226) (0.131) (0.230) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004)
Corr. idiosync. GDP −0.1331 −0.1331 −0.0048 −0.0048 −0.5364∗∗∗ −0.4206∗∗∗−0.0336 −0.0063
(0.559) (0.917) (0.563) (0.926) (0.067) (0.066) (0.022) (0.022)
Correl. in stock returns 1.2633 1.2633 0.9501 0.9501 2.7916∗∗∗ 2.2589∗∗∗ 0.6493∗∗∗ 0.5280∗∗∗
(1.458) (1.364) (1.468) (1.394) (0.143) (0.145) (0.044) (0.045)
Correl. growth-stock return −0.9500 −0.9500 −1.1560 −1.1560∗ −0.1713∗∗ −0.0042 −0.0126 0.0189
(0.893) (0.618) (0.916) (0.664) (0.080) (0.080) (0.021) (0.021)
Tax treaty −0.3032 −0.3032∗ −0.2879 −0.2879∗∗ −0.1162∗∗ −0.1291∗∗∗ 0.1720∗∗∗ 0.1558∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.155) (0.229) (0.144) (0.047) (0.046) (0.014) (0.014)
Freedom in host country 0.0628∗∗∗ 0.0628∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.028) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant −8.4242∗∗∗−10.7188∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.183)
Observations 2772 2772 2772 2772 4606 4606 4672 4672
R-squared 0.136 0.136 0.140 0.140 0.195 0.207 0.332 0.349
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated equations: log(xij) = φij + νt + βZij + ij .
All models include time dummies. Columns (1) and (3) report panel instrumental variable fixed effects estimate and White (1980) heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Columns (2) and (4) report panel fixed effects instrumental variable estimate with Discroll and Kraay (1998) standard
errors robust to cross sectional dependence, heteroscedasticity and first order autocorrelation. We have employed as excluded instruments lagged
values of the following variables: correlation in stock returns, correlation in growth-stock return, correlation in idiosyncratic GDP and logged
bilateral trade. Dependent variable in regressions (5) and (6) is: log(xij + 0.001). Dependent variable in regressions (7) and (8) is a binary
variable taking value 1 if xij > 0 and zero otherwise. Columns (7) and (8) report marginal effects.
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Table 7: 2001-2009 Panel estimates in log differences
with pair fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Panel FE Panel FE Panel FE Panel FE
Full Sample
∆ log bilateral trade 0.7057∗∗∗ 0.7057∗∗∗ 0.7061∗∗∗ 0.7061∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.035) (0.057) (0.035)
∆Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP −0.3484∗∗∗ −0.3484∗∗∗ −0.3457∗∗∗ −0.3457∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.093) (0.111) (0.092)
∆Correl. in stock returns 1.6643∗∗∗ 1.6643 1.6635∗∗∗ 1.6635
(0.499) (1.167) (0.499) (1.169)
∆Correl. growth-stock return 0.9695∗∗∗ 0.9695∗∗∗ 0.9679∗∗∗ 0.9679∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.225) (0.125) (0.225)
Tax treaty −0.0934∗∗∗ −0.0934 −0.0923∗∗∗ −0.0923
(0.032) (0.083) (0.032) (0.083)
Freedom in the host country −0.0018∗ −0.0018
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.0527∗∗∗ 0.0527 0.1781∗∗ 0.0000
(0.017) (0.039) (0.072) (0.000)
Observations 8722 8722 8722 8722
R-squared 0.484 0.484 0.484 0.484
OECD countries
∆ log bilateral trade 0.6891∗∗∗ 0.6891∗∗∗ 0.6896∗∗∗ 0.6896∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.038) (0.064) (0.039)
∆Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP −0.3445∗∗∗ −0.3445∗∗∗ −0.3412∗∗∗ −0.3412∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.094) (0.112) (0.093)
∆Correl. in stock returns 1.6373∗∗∗ 1.6373 1.6358∗∗∗ 1.6358
(0.517) (1.161) (0.516) (1.165)
∆Correl. growth-stock return 0.9788∗∗∗ 0.9788∗∗∗ 0.9771∗∗∗ 0.9771∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.237) (0.127) (0.237)
Tax treaty −0.0820∗∗ −0.0820 −0.0806∗∗ −0.0806
(0.036) (0.085) (0.036) (0.084)
Freedom in the host country −0.0021∗ −0.0021
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.0115 0.0115 0.2852∗∗∗ 0.2234∗
(0.020) (0.036) (0.091) (0.115)
Observations 6222 6222 6222 6222
R-squared 0.515 0.515 0.515 0.515
Emerging countries
∆ log bilateral trade 0.6262∗∗∗ 0.6262∗∗∗ 0.6273∗∗∗ 0.6273∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.054) (0.104) (0.054)
∆Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP −0.0687 −0.0687 −0.0661 −0.0661
(0.380) (0.535) (0.380) (0.535)
∆Correl. in stock returns 1.3992 1.3992 1.3982 1.3982
(1.403) (1.537) (1.401) (1.533)
∆Correl. growth-stock return −0.4162 −0.4162∗∗∗ −0.4204 −0.4204∗∗∗
(0.328) (0.120) (0.327) (0.119)
Tax treaty −0.3450∗∗∗ −0.3450∗∗∗ −0.3466∗∗∗ −0.3466∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.094) (0.064) (0.095)
Freedom in the host country −0.0018 −0.0018
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.1799∗ 0.0000
(0.010) (0.005) (0.105) (0.000)
Observations 2500 2500 2500 2500
R-squared 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated equations: ∆ log(xij) = φij + νt + β∆Zij + ij
Estimates are weighted by the average amount (over time) of equity investments of
country i in country j. All models includes time dummies. Columns (1) and (3) report
panel fixed effects estimate and White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors. Columns (2) and (4) report panel fixed effects instrumental variable estimate
with Discroll and Kraay (1998) standard errors robust to cross sectional dependence,
heteroscedasticity and first order autocorrelation.
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Table 8: Degree of risk sharing versus correlation of idiosyncratic GDP
A) All shocks B) Positive shocks C) Negative shocks
OECD OECD OECD
Inflows Inflows Inflows
Correlation coefficient −0.07 −0.05 −0.01
[0.76] [0.82] [0.95]
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient −0.03 −0.05 −0.18
[0.91] [0.82] [0.42]
Kendall’s tau rank correlation coefficient −0.03 −0.04 −0.11
[0.87] [0.82] [0.50]
country weighted avg corr GDP id %risk shared %risk shared %risk shared
TUR −0.13 5.16 12.10 2.40
CHL −0.07 −0.10 4.57 −2.59
ISR −0.03 −0.95 0.02 −1.58
ISL 0.05 −15.32 −19.67 −11.19
US 0.09 −5.89 −3.30 −7.99
CHE 0.10 −5.67 −9.89 −3.27
AUS 0.12 −8.44 −41.06 −1.30
KOR 0.13 0.29 2.17 −0.58
IRL 0.15 −19.79 20.14 −80.91
NLD 0.17 16.14 9.48 24.69
GBR 0.19 19.33 24.69 17.73
SWE 0.19 −11.60 1.22 −18.64
FIN 0.20 −3.47 4.32 −6.19
NOR 0.25 −6.91 −13.88 −3.66
DNK 0.28 −0.21 1.78 −1.55
AUT 0.34 3.88 1.33 5.31
GER 0.36 −0.47 4.22 −6.23
CAN 0.36 −4.61 −10.72 −0.71
ITA 0.40 −1.41 5.75 −6.26
FRA 0.40 −14.70 −14.98 −14.58
PRT 0.43 0.11 6.91 −5.26
ESP 0.48 −5.27 −5.18 −5.33
A) All shocks B) Positive shocks C) Negative shocks
EMU EMU EMU
Inflows Inflows Inflows
Correlation coefficient −0.47 −0.75 0.19
[0.20] [0.02] [0.62]
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient −0.43 −0.83 −0.07
[0.24] [0.01] [0.86]
Kendall’s tau rank correlation coefficient −0.33 −0.67 −0.11
[0.25] [0.02] [0.75]
country weighted avg corr GDP id %risk shared %risk shared %risk shared
IRL 0.15 −13.38 20.71 −61.61
NLD 0.17 26.62 66.82 1.69
FIN 0.20 −1.28 12.27 −4.87
AUT 0.34 10.78 24.22 −5.11
GER 0.36 −2.43 14.37 −23.15
ITA 0.40 −20.78 −21.59 −20.43
FRA 0.40 −34.77 −24.79 −39.99
PRT 0.43 0.78 11.20 −5.10
ESP 0.48 −15.83 −35.81 −7.99
Significance values in parentheses.
The degree of risk sharing is estimated according to the methodology explained in appendix C and it refers only to income inflows
from abroad. A negative sign for % risk shared means a dis-smoothing effect of asset income inflows from abroad. GDP id stands
for idiosyncratic GDP growth rate calculated as explained in appendix B.
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